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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE ROAD COMl\,1ISSION OF UTAH, 1 
Petitioner, l 
-vs-
urrAH POWER & LIGHT CO., a corpora-
tion; MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY 
CO., a corporation; and MOUNTAIN 
STATES TELEPHONE & TELE-
GRAPH CO., a corporation, 
Respondents. 
I 
Case No. 9136 
PETI'riON FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
On May 26, 1960, the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah affirmed a Summary Judgment rendered in the 
Third Judicial District Court in favor of Respondents and 
declared as constitutional Chapter 53, Laws of Utah 1957, 
commonly referred to hereinafter as the Utility Relocation 
Act, codified as Section 27-2-7(22) (a), U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended. 
It is submitted and alleged that, in respect to the con-
stitutional issues raised, the Court was in error. Further, 
even were such statute assumed constitutional, problems 
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2 
in the interpretation and construction of said Act persist, 
making application thereof impossible without further clar-
ification and amplification of the Supreme Court decision 
as written. 
For these reasons and because of the far reaching con-
sequences of the decision as rendered, the State Road 
Commission of Utah herewith petitions the Court to re-
hear the immediate matter based on the facts and points 
set forth hereinafter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Federal Highway Act of 1956 provides as follows: 
"When a State shall pay for the cost of relocation 
of utility facilities necessitated by the construction 
of a project on the Federal-aid primary or second-
ary systems or on the Interstate System, including 
extensions thereof within urban areas, Federal 
funds may be used to reimburse the State for such 
cost in the same proportion as Federal funds are 
expended on the project. Federal funds shall not 
be used to reimburse the State under this section 
when the payment to the utility violates the law of 
the State or violates a legal contract between the 
utility and the State. * * *" (Emphasis added). 
(23 u.s.c. 123). 
Subsequent to the Federal Act, the Utah Legislature 
by Laws of Utah 1957, Chapter 53, passed the following 
act to take effect May 14, 1957: 
"The Commission [State Road Commission] shall 
have the following powers and duties: 
* * * (22) (a) To make reasonable regulations for the 
installation, construction, maintenance, repair, re-
newal and relocation of all facilities and drainage 
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3 
and irrigation systems (herein called 'facilities') 
of any utility in, on, along, over, across, through, 
or under any project on the federal-aid primary or 
secondary systems of highways as the same now 
are or may hereafter be defined by Act of Congress, 
or on the interstate system, as herein defined, in-
cluding extensions thereof within urban areas. 
Whenever the commission shall determine that it 
is necessary that any such facilities which now are, 
or hereafter may be, located in, on, along, over, 
across, through or under any such federal-aid pri-
mary or secondary system or on the interstate sys-
tem, including extensions thereof within urban 
areas, should be relocated, the utility or political 
subdivision owning or operating such facilities 
shall relocate the same in accordance with the order 
of the commission; provided, however, that the cost 
of relocation in connection with the highway sys-
tems as defined in this paragraph, shall be paid by 
,the commission in all cases where proportionate 
reimbursement of such cost may be obtained by the 
state of Utah from the United States pursuant to 
the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956. In case of 
any such relocation of facilities, as aforesaid, the 
utility or political subdivision owning or operating 
the same, its successors or assigns, may maintain 
and operate such facilities, with the necessary ap-
purtenances, in the new location or locations." 
(Emphasis added). 
(Section 27-2-7 (22) (a), U.C.A. 195·3, as amended). 
In approximately June, 1957, the State Road Commis-
sion requested each of the respondents herein to relocate 
certain facilities situated within public right of way to 
facilitate highway construction in connection with federal 
aid road building projects. In each case the utility demand-
ed that the State Road Commission pay the relocation costs 
incurred. In each case the utility occupied the right-of-way 
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by virtue of a franchise agreement with the political sub-
division involved. 
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany had been given a fifty year franchise from December 
29, 1947, by Davis County to occupy certain portions of a 
county road known as Howard Street. Though the fran-
chise agreement stipulated that the Company would be 
subject to all lawful exercise of the police power by the 
county, nothing was said therein as to relocation costs. 
(See Exhibit A.) 
The Mountain Fuel Supply Company had been grant-
ed a fifty year franchise from October 27, 1953, by Salt 
Lake City to occupy certain portions of 7th East Street. 
Though this franchise agreement likewise stipulated that 
the Company would at all times during the life of the fran-
chise be subject to all lawful exercise of the police power 
by the City, nothing was said therein as to relocation costs. 
(See Exhibit B.) 
The Utah Power and Light Company had been given 
a fifty year franchise from January 1, 1951, by Salt Lake 
City to occupy certain portions of Sixth West Street. 
Though this franchise agreement stipulated that all lines, 
poles, towers, conduits and other structures constructed 
under the grant should be located as to cause minimum 
interference with the proper use of such streets, alleys and 
public places, nothing was said as to relocation costs. (See 
Exhibit C.) 
On advice of the Attorney General, the Road Com-
mission refused to pay the relocation costs demanded by 
the respondents, and this action was brought by the. Com-
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5 
mission under the provisions of the Declaratory Judgments 
Act, Chapter 33, Title 78, U.C.A. 1953, to determine the 
constitutionality of the Utility Relocation Act and the ob-
ligation of the State Road Commission thereunder. The 
District Court held the Utility Relocation Act to be consti-
tutional and ordered the State Road Commission to reim-
burse the respondent utilities for their relocation costs. 
This Court then affirmed by its decision of May 26, 1960. 
S'f A TEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE USE BY THE RESPONDENTS OF PUBLIC 
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY IN THE EMPLACE-
MENT OF THEIR FACILITIES DOES NOT 
CONST~ITUTE A USE PUBLIC IN NATURE SO 
AS TO VOID THE OPERATION OF ARTICLE 
VI, SECTION 31 OFI THE UTAI-I CONSTITU-
TION. 
POINT II 
THE PERMISSIVE USE OF THE PUBLIC 
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF'-WAY BY THE UTILI-
TY IN EMPLACING ITS FACILITIES THERE-
ON DOES NOT VEST IN IT A PROPERTY 
RIGHT OF ANY NATURE. 
POINT III 
NEITHER THE UTILITY RELOCATION ACT 
NOR THE DECISION AS RENDERED IMPOSES 
AN OBLIGATION UPON THE STATE ROAD 
COMMISSION TO REIMBURSE RELOCATION 
COSTS IN CONTRA VENTI ON OF THE SPECI-
FIC TERMS OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT BE-
TWEEN THE UTILITY AND THE STATE ROAD 
COMMISSION. 
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POINT IV 
TO THE CONTRARY THE UTILITY R·ELOCA-
TION ACT SPECIFICALLY PROTECTS ·TH·E 
OBLIGA·TION OF CONTRACT AND ABSOLVES 
THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION FROM RELO-
CATION COSTS WHERE BY WRITING, SUCH 
OBLIGA·TION HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN AS-
SUMED BY THE UTILI1:,Y. 
POINT V 
THE UTILITY RELOCATION ACT IS, BY ITS 
VERY TERMS, DEVISABLE AND THE PROVISO 
REGARDING RELOCATION COSTS DOES NOT 
QUALIFY OR EFFECT THE PLENARY POWER 
GRANTED TO THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION 
TO REGULATE, CONTROL AND RELOCATE 
FACILITIES LOCATED ON A PUBLIC RIGHT-
OF-WAY. 
POINT VI 
THE PERMISSIVE USE GRANTED TO A UTIL-
ITY OF THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE A USE AS NECESSARY AND 
INDISPENSABLE AS THE USE OF SUCH 




THE USE BY THE RESPONDENTS OF PUBLIC 
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY IN THE EMPLACE-
MENT OF THEIR FACILITIES DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE A USE PUBLIC IN NATURE SO 
AS TO VOID THE OPE,RATION OF ARTICLE 
VI, SE,CTION 31 O·F THE UTAH CONSTITU-
TION. 
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It was the contention of the State of Utah heretofore, 
and it shall continue to be the State's contention herein, 
that to allow the specific statute, 27-2-7(22), U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, to finance the cost of placing and relocating the 
facilities of privately owned utilities on the highway right-
of-way of the State of Utah and the cost, to a large extent, 
of the facilities themselves at public expense, is to fly into 
the face of the constitutional mandate prohibiting the lend-
ing of public credit to a private instrumentality. If it be 
admitted, and we believe that it has so been and is, that 
the respondents are engaged in private enterprise, that 
their assets are acquired through the medium of capital 
subscription and contribution from private sources, that 
a primary purpose thereof is to realize a net return on in-
vested capital, that private individuals receive payments 
in the form of dividends from the respondents based on net 
profits and in proportion to representative interests, that 
to some extent the respondents compete among themselves 
for customers and new business, and that they are private 
and independent instrumentalities devoted to profit-mak-
ing ventures while performing their services, then without 
reservation it may be said that a contribution of public 
moneys for the respondents' use in the furtherance of their 
businesses, absent a basis in contractual obligation or legal 
indebtedness, contravenes the import of the Constitution. 
It is agreed without exception by all parties hereto 
that a utility, exclusive of legislation to the contrary, plac-
ing its facilities on the public streets and highways, gains 
no property rigbt thereby, and upon demand of the public 
authority, pursuant to lawful and reasonable exercise of 
the police power, it must remove the facility at its own 
expense and cost. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage 
Commission, 197 U.S. 453, 25 S. Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831; State 
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of' Idaho v. Idaho Power Co. and the Mountain States Tele~ 
phone and Telegraph Co., -Ida.-, 346 P.2d 596 (1959); 
New York City Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated Edison 
Co. of New York, 295 N.Y. 467, 68 N.E.2d 445; State High-
way Commission of New Mexico v. Southern Union Gas 
Co., 65 N.Mex. 84, 332 P.2d 1007; State of Tennessee v. 
Southern Bell Telephone Co., 319 S.W.2d 90 (Tenn.); Bell 
Telephone Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission, 
12 A.2d 479 (Pa.). The majority opinion in the instant case 
accepts this observation as accurate. Nothing by way of 
a vested property interest accrues to the utility by reason 
of the. franchise voluntarily given it by the state, nor does 
the state suffer any obligation or indebtedness to the com-
pany in permitting it to utilize the public right-of-way. The 
risk of removing and relocating the facilities rests at the 
feet of the company under the classic rule recognized in 
virtually all jurisdictions of "damnum absque injuria." 
New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Commission of New 
Orleans, supra; State of Idaho v. Idaho Power Co. and 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra. By 
this fact that· the utility acquires no property interest in 
and to the public right-of-way, the requirement by the state 
government to remove and relocate the facilities does not 
constitute or qualify as a taking within the eminent domain 
clause of the Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 22, or statutes, 78-
34-1- et seq, but rather remains constant as a proper police 
power regulation. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. The 
City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 34 S. Ct. 364, 58 L.Ed. 721. 
It is safe to say that the common law may be ~odified~ 
altered or changed by the Legislature, and with this propo-
sition we have no quarrel; we would but add thereto, that 
as a . condition precedent to such alteration, modification 
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or change, the statute comply with the elements of consti-
tutional law in all respects and that a failure to adhere to 
such must result in it being stricken as invalid. 
This Court, in its opinion, set forth a list of cases al-
legedly to have dealt with or passed on the constitutional-
ity of similar legislation under simular constitutional 
provisions. With due respect, we would argue that the 
weight of authority is by no means in favor of the respon-
dents' contentions, and further, we would allege that sev-
eral of the cases cited by the Court have no application or 
relevancy to the case at bar. 
To begin with, the Court cites the Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 132 A.2d 440 (Me. 1957). The rule is well recognized 
in those jurisdictions wherein the Justices of a court may 
be called upon to advise as to the constitutionality of pro-
posed legislation, that any opinion delivered in such ad-
visory capacity does not constitu~e an official judicial 
decision of the highest court and any question brought 
forth or considered under such an opinion may be litigated 
at a subsequent time without being barred by the doctrine 
of res adjudicata. In no sense does the proceeding partake 
of an adversary nature and opposing arguments are not 
formally presented. Martin v. Maine Saving Bank, 147 A.2d 
137 (Me.); Opinion of Justices, 76 N.H. 597, 74 A. 490. 
The appropriateness of this decision is well taken in 
connection with the interpretation of Section (e) of the 
statute under consideration, which reads in part: 
"The cost of relocating utility facilities in connec-
tion with any project on the Federal-Aid primary 
or secondary systems or on the Interstate System 
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10 
is hereby declared to be a cost of highway con-
struction." (Emphasis added). 
The Justices, in commenting upon the section above quot-
ed, stated: 
''We do not commonly consider that a power com-
pany in erecting a pole line or a water district in 
laying a pipe in a highway is constructing a high-
way. To an even lesser degree would we consider 
the construction of a pole or a water pipe across 
country to be the construction or reconstruction of 
a highway, although the reason for the relocation 
was occasioned solely by changes in the highway." 
It cannot be refuted, therefore, that in analyzing Section 
(e) of 27-2-7(22), U.C.A. 1953, as amended, that the Maine 
opinion is authority for the principles advocated herein 
by the State of Utah. 
T'he case of Baltimore Gas and Electric Co. v. the State 
Road Commission of Maryland, 214 Md. 266, 134 A.2d 312, 
cited by this Court, did not involve the constitutionality 
of any statute nor were any constitutional questions raised 
by either party therein. Since the immediate case under 
consideration is directed solely to the constitutionality of 
legislation, we deem and do allege the Maryland decision 
not deserving of consideration. 
The majority opinion further cites the Opinion of the 
Justices of New Hampshire, 132 A.2d 613 (N.H. 1957), as 
authority on the subject. We respectfully submit that it 
takes little time to reveal that the Justices of New Hamp-
shire, in their opinion, considered constitutional problems 
quite unlike that which exist in Utah, for the New Hamp-
shire Constitution is absent of any directive prohibiting the 
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sovereign state from lending its credit to private instru-
me'!Ltalities or to finance private undertakings. The Justices 
therein held that if the Legislature decided to alter the 
common law, it would not be in violation of its constitution, 
Part 2, Art. 5th, or Part 1, Art. lOth. 
The respondents herein cited these sections of the New 
Hampshire Constitution in their original brief submitted. 
I is interesting to view the contents of said sections in 
comparison with the clear mandate of Article VI, Section 
31 of the Utah Constitution: 
"Pt. 2, Art. 5th. And further, full power and au-
thority are hereby given and granted to the said 
general court, from time to time, to make, ordain, 
and establish, all manner of wholesome and reason-
able orders, laws, statutes, ordinances, directions, 
and instructions, either with penalties, or without, 
so as the same be not repugnant or contrary to this 
constitution, as they may judge for the benefit and 
welfare of this state, and for the governing and 
ordering thereof, and of the subjects of the same, 
for the necessary support and defense of the gov-
ernment thereof, * * * provided that the general 
court shall not authorize any town to loan or give 
its money or credit directly or indirectly for the 
benefit of any corporation having for its object a 
dividend of profits or in any way aid the same by 
taking its stock or bonds. Fror the purpose of en-
couraging conservation of the forest resources of 
the state, the general court may provide for special 
assessments, rates and taxes on growing wood and 
timber." (Emphasis added). 
"Pt. 1, Art. lOth. Government being instituted for 
the common benefit, protection, and security, of the 
whole community, and not for the private interest 
or emolument of any one man, family, or class of 
men; therefore, whenever the ends of government 
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are perverted, and public liberty manifestly en-
dangered, and all other means of redress are inef-
fectual, the people may, and of right ought to re-
form the old, or establish a new government. The 
doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power, 
and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive 
of the good and happiness of mankind." 
(New Hampshire State Constitution) 
Part 2, Art. 5th prohibits a town from loaning its 
money or credit to any corporation issuing dividends based 
on profits, but it exempts from its operation the sovereign 
state or any other political subdivision, and under the well 
settled and accepted rule of construction, expressio unius 
e~t exclusio alterius (Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 19 
L.Ed. 1868), the State or the State Road Commission would 
be specifically excluded from its operation. The fact that 
the Justices of New Hampshire had not a constitutional 
provision parallel to that of Art. VI, Sec. 31 of the Utah 
Constitution before them for construction renders this 
opinion valueless in the present determination. 
The same objection is found in the case of Wilson v. 
Longbranch, 142 A.2d 837 (New Jers~y), which not only 
failed to consider the statute similar in scope to 27-2-7(22), 
but also lacked a ruling as to the constitutionality of any 
legislation; authorities need· hardly be cited to buttress 
the statement that a court will not pass upon the constitu-
tionality of specific legislation unless the question is 
brought directly before it and unless it is necessary for the 
determination of the litigant's.right in the matter pending. 
State v. Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P.2d 414; Wright v. Lee~ 
101 Utah 76, 118 P.2d 132; Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. 
The Arkansas Department of Public Utiliti-es, 58 S. Ct. 770, 
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304 U.S. 61, 82 L.Ed. 1149; Spector Motor Service v. Mc.-
Laughlin, 65 S. Ct. 152, 323 U.S. 101, 89 L.Ed. 101. 
Additional cases mentioned in the main opinion of this 
Court, New York Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated Edison 
Co., 295 N.Y. 467, 68 N.E.2d 445 (N.Y. 1946); Transit Com-
mission v. Long Island Railroad Co., 253 N.Y. 345, 171 N.E. 
565, while seemingly supporting the theory that the uni-
versal common law may be modified by a properly drawn 
statute, do not mention or pass upon the validity of such 
legislation in the light of constitutional provisions anal-
agous to Art. VI, Sec. 31 of the Utah Constitution. Conse-
quently they are of no precedent in the case at bar. 
Further, the New York Court in Westchester Electric 
Railroad Co. v. Westchester County Park Commission, 255 
N.Y. 297, 174 N.E. 660 (cited in the majority opinion), de-
votes no attention to the validity of a statute authorizing 
reimbursement to utilities when subject to constitutional 
attack; stretched to the fartherest point the decision stands 
for nothing more than the fact that a statute was enacted 
prescribing payment for relocation costs. 
It is thus seen beyond doubt that the cases mentioned 
in the preceding paragraphs when scrutinized for the 
questions of law raised therein and the conclusions of law 
resulting therefrom, stand in the darkness of inapplicabil-
ity, and if it be the conclusion of this Court that the de-
termination of the instant case is predicated upon the 
counting of decisions, as evidenced by the language of the 
main opinion, then we respectfully submit and petition 
that the court exclude those decisions which fall short of 
any constitutional issues and those in which the constitu-
tion of the respective jurisdiction fails to contain a prohi-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
bition ,on a ·comparable basis ·with,·Art. VI, Sec. 31. 'T·he 
decisions in Tennessee (State of Tennessee v. Southern Bell 
Telephone Co., supra), Texas (State of Texas v. The City 
of Austin and the City of Dallas, -S.W.2d-), New Mexico 
(State l-Iighway Commission of New Mexico v. Southern 
Union Gas Company, supra), Minnesota (Minneapolis Gas 
Co. v. Zimmerman, 91 N.W.2d 642), and Idaho (State of 
Idaho v. Idaho Power Co. and Mountain States Telephone 
and Telegraph Co., supra), which test statutes similar in 
scope to 27-2-7(22) under constitutional provisions analag-
ous with the pertinent sections of the Utah Constitution, 
are to be considered. The case of Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co. v. The State Highway Commissioner of North 
Dakota, Supreme Court No. 7856, -N.W.2d- ·(March 
1960) merits special comment, however, for the holding is 
unlike its companion cases in the five other jurisdictions. 
The Constitution of North Dakota, Section 185, provides in 
part: 
"The state, any county or city may make internal 
improvements and may engage in any industry, 
enterprise, or business, not prohibited. by Article 
30 of the Constitution, but neither the state nor 
any political subdivision thereof shall otherwise 
loan or give its credit or make donations to or in 
aid to any individual, association or corporation 
* * * " 
The North Dakota Court held that the State may make 
internal improvements, that public financing of a private-
ly owned corporation in relocating its facilities on the pub-
lic right-of-way qualified as an internal improvement, that 
the subsequent clause prohibiting the State or any political 
subdivision from loaning or giving -its credits i,n aid of any 
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individual or corpora ton acted by way of limitation, and did 
not restrict the capacity of the State to make internal im-
provements even though such improvements might other-
wise be classed as a gift of public funds. The effect of the 
North Dakota decision is to admit that the payment of 
relocation costs by the Highway Department might be 
considered a gift of public funds, the question being of no 
concern, because Section 185 permits of such disburse-
ment. The Court declared: 
"For the reasons set forth it is of no concern to 
this court whether Section 24-0141 of the 1957 sup-
plement to N.D.R.C. 1943 [Utility Relocation Act] 
does or does not provide for a donation or an exten-
sion of credit.'' 
The language of the North Dakota decision, therefore, ex-
cludes itself from presently being considered. 
The Tennessee, New Mexico and Idaho decisions, 
supra, leave nothing unturned in their interpretation of 
the "lending of credit" section of the Constitution and defi-
nition of public use. To come within the confines of the 
Constitution, the Tennessee court had this to say: 
"The expenditure [to pass the test of public use] 
must be for a state purpose, which function the 
state performs for its general public, agencies and 
instrumentalities of the state for the accomplish-
ment of a state purpose under state control; and 
the state must have the * * * right of use * * * 
of the property upon which the fund its expended. 
* * * 
The basic test under this section of our Constitu-
tion is whether the expenditure is for a state pur-
pose. In the present case the primary purpose 
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served by the expenditure is for the convenience 
and benefit of the utilities, the purpose cannot be 
public." · · 
We petition and urge upon the Court that the expen-
ditures contemplated by Section 27-2-7(22) serve no public 
purpose; once the disbursement has been effectuated, con-
trol and use of the donation thereafter rests solely with 
the utility and is next represented in the annual profit and 
loss statement of the company. It is well to exercise the 
great equitable powers of the Court in a situation where 
equity is justified, but this is not such a situation. The use 
of the public right-of-way by the respondents was and is 
permissive in the first and initial instance; they placed 
the facilities on the highway knowing full well that the 
obligation to remove and relocate was on their shoulders, 
notwithstanding the financial consequences of so doing; 
if resort to equitable powers be proper in this instance, 
then it would be correct to say that the Legislature may 
properly aid and finance all individuals who are required 
to expend funds to establish business facilities. We would 
urge that the facts of the immediate case are not within 
the purview of Oswego v. Syracuse Railroad Co., 226 N.Y. 
351, 124 N.E. 8 (quoted in the main opinion) for the use 
therein by the railroad of its bridge spanning the canal was 
not consensual or permissive in nature, the structure hav-
ing abutted on railroad right-of-way on each side of the 
canal. The process of enlarging the width of the canal 
necessitated the relocation of the bridge facility and it was 
on this sole basis that Oswego was decided. The present 
case is allied neither factually nor legally with Oswego v. 
Syracuse Railroad Co., supra, and for this reason_we would 
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urge that the principles of equity expounded therein are 
inappropriate here. 
The fact that the purpose behind the gift is in some 
respects commendable cannot of itself invoke the powers 
of equity. As was proclaimed in State Highway Commis-
sion of New Mexico v. Southern Union Gas Company, 
supra. 
"* * * That the legislature has the power to be 
equitable and just we may admit, but that power 
is restricted by the Constitution. Otherwise the 
prohibition against a donation would have no mean-
ing or effect. As stated in State ex rel. Sena v. 
Trujillo (46 N.M. 361, 129 P2d 333) 'the consti-
tution makes no distinction as between "donations," 
whether they be for a good cause or a questionable 
one. It prohibits them all * * * .' " 
The New Mexico Supreme Court provided a ready answer 
to the question of whether a utility, in placing its facilities 
on public right of way, acts in the public interest. It stated: 
"* * * The line is the property of the utility and to 
be used solely by it, neither the state nor the public 
having any right to use these lines. * * *" 
The New Mexico Court made, what we respectfully urge 
to be the correct analysis of the utilities' position and 
function in society, in saying: 
"* * * The Southern Union Gas Company is not 
a subordinate governmental agency nor is it fulfill-
ing a governmental function although it is serving 
a highly useful purpose in the great American free 
enterprise tradition by furnishing for profit an es-
sential commodity to the people of this state." (Em-
phasis added.) 
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In State of Idaho v. The Idaho Power Co. and Moun-
tain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., supra, the court, 
after having made what may be the most exhaustive analy-
sis thus far rendered by any judiciary passing on the ques-
tion, distinguished the profit-making purposes of a utility, 
its ultimate aim, from the type of service rendered: 
''The fact that respondents' activities, in furnishing 
services to the public, are public in nature and may 
be devoted to public use is insufficient to remove 
payment of the relocation costs from the constitu-
tional prohibitions. The state has not acquired and 
cannot acquire the property of any privately owned 
utility, as are respondents, or any interest therein; 
nor any control over respondents or their officers, 
except in certain limited aspects through the public 
utilities commission; nor does the state direct the 
acquisition and disposition of propertes, or control 
the financial transactions of privately owned util-
ities; nor is the property owned by such utilities, 
public property exempt from taxation as provided 
by Idaho Const., Art. 7, Sec. 4; and whereas, such 
utilities may, and do, use their moneys and prop-
erties for profit, the state and its political subdi-
visions are prohibited from making a profit directly 
or indirectly by the use of public moneys, Idaho 
Const., Art. 7, Sec. 10. Nor is any grant authorized 
in favor of any utility, of a vested or permanent in-
terest in any public thoroughfare, the right to the 
use being permissive and as not to incommode the 
public use thereof." 
If the respondents may be reimbursed for removing their 
facilities from a locale formerly utilized only with the con-
sent of the State of Utah, would it not also then be consti-
tutionally proper to pay and finance P.I.E. Freightways 
and other commercial hauling companies for costs that 
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might be incurred in being forced to use a detour of several 
' . ·: 
hundred miles during the construction or reconstruction 
of a state arterial highway. Commercial trucking is most 
certainly one of the purposes for which modern highways 
are utilized, although such use is permissive in nature. and 
subject to the reasonable exercise of the police power; or 
it might be persuasively argued hereinafter that the state 
should finance and pay for the cost of laying transmission 
gas lines and pipe into an area previo'usly unserviced on 
the theory that this would be beneficial to the populace in 
such area. The possible ramifications of such a holding are 
untold in nature and number. 
Realities of the Situation. It has been suggested by 
respondents and noted by this Court in the major opinion 
that refusal to recognize constitutional validity would im-
pose unjustified burdens on utility consumers in those jur-
isdictions wherein relocation costs were not satisfied by the 
Bureau of Public Roads-that, in effect, it would force the 
utility user to pay twice (once at the gas pumps and again 
at the utility office). From the viewpoint of applying the 
mandate of the Constitution, the argument is hardly worth 
comment. The conclusion is obvious that a customer of 
the respondents has no interest in the properties of the 
utilities and the fact that relocation costs are requisite does 
no affect his position. (The record in this case is silent in 
respect to one instance where utility costs have increased 
by reason of relocation expenditures.) Then too, in the 
United States, only thirteen of fifty states possess legisla-
tion providing for subsidization of utilities for relocaton 
expenses, so that residents of Utah find themselves in a 
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status no different than the utility customers iii thirty-
seven other jurisdictions. 
One "reality" which faces residents of Utah is that 
this state is allocated a proportion of the amount of al-
lotted federal funds for highway purposes and the reduc-
tion in the amount of funds available for right-of-way 
acquisition and road construction simply means that fewer 
miles ·of freeways and highways will be built. We would 
submit that of the two "realities" mentioned, the latter is 
in the more critical class. 
' 
Wallberg v. The Utah Public Welfare Commission, 
115 Utah 242, 203 P.2d 935, has been cited as authority that 
a moral obligation of the state may be recognized. This 
petitioner would allege that Wall berg involved not a dona-
tion or gift of public moneys, for the statute under consid-
eration created a lien on the recipient's -real property, and 
a receipt of any public disbursements was conditioned upon 
the pledge of all real property interests as security for 
later reimbursement by the pledgor. Justice Wade in his 
concurring opinion, hit the mark when he said: 
"* * * in my opinion the Public Assistance Act of 
1947, as amended in 1948, creates an obligation 
against the estate of every recipient to repay the 
total amount of public assistance received by him 
during his lifetime. 
* * * 
"The above quoted paragraph, definitely requires 
the repayment of all assistance received, the same 
as other claims in the course of administration of 
the estate of every recipient. * * * 
* * * 
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"I therefore conclude that the intention of the leg-
islature in enacting that paragraph was to make 
all assistance given to any recipient payable after 
his death under the provisions of subdivision (5), 
of Section 102-9-22, U.C.A. 1943, the same as other 
claims in the course of the administration of the 
estate." (E.mphasis added) 
The Constitution of this state stands supreme in the 
final accounting of our social order and is not subject to 
the wavering tides of local opinion. As declared in Judd 
v. Board of Education, 15 N.E.2d 576, 118 ALR 789 (N.Y. 
App.): 
"A written constitution is not only the direct and 
basic expression of the soverign will, but it is the 
absolute rule of action and decision for all depart-
ments and offices of government in respect to all 
matters covered by it, and must control as it is 
written until it shall be changed by the authority 
that established it. * * * When that sovereign will 
has been clearly expressed, it is the duty of the 
courts rigidly to enforce it. It is not the province 
of the courts to circumvent it because of pri-
vate notions of justice or because of personal 
inclinations. * * *" 
This Court, in Moon Lake Electric Association and 
Uintah Basin Telephone Association v. Utah State Tax 
Commission, 9 U.2d 384, 345 P.2d 612, stated the law to be: 
"* * * Where, however, the mind is convinced of 
the unconstitutionality of the law, the duty which 
devolves upon the court to declare it so is impeTa-
tive, even where, as in this case, the statute appears 
to be in consonance with justice and humanity. 
That the law itself would be beneficient can be of 
no avail in this case, because its effect and operation 
would be to exempt property, against the mandate 
of the fundamental law." 
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It is the fond desire of ·this petitioner not to burden 
the Court with materials discussed on original appeal. It 
it our feeling, however, that the gravity of this question 
merits reconsideration, and we respectfully urge and pe-
tition this Court to rehear argument on the constitutional-
ity of 27-2-7(22). The Highway Fund of this State can ill 
afford the loss of moneys desperately needed for construc-
tion and completion of the highway system throughout the 
State of Utah. 
POINT II 
THE PERMISSIVE USE OF THE PUBLIC 
HIGHWAY RIGHT-OF-WAY BY THE UTILI-
TY IN EMPLACING ITS FACILITIES THERE-
01\J DOES NOT VEST IN IT A PROPERTY 
RIGHT OF ANY NATURE. 
The respondents in this case have maintained their 
facilities in the past on public right-of-way solely on the 
basis of franchise agreements entered into by and between 
them, respectively, and the State of Utah. The utilities' 
presence on the highway exists not as of right but as the 
result of the consent of the State or other political subdi-
vision thereof. If the State of Utah deems it in the public 
interest to exclude utility facilities from the public right-
of-way in order to facilitate the safe flow of vehicular traf-
fic, it may do so as a proper adjunct of the police power. 
The broad and sweeping language of the major opinion in 
the instant case might indicate a contrary result, wherein 
it was said: 
"* * *We subscribe to the doctrine that the utilities 
are at horne on the public highways; * * * public 
welfare demands that the people be served with 
water, sewer systems, electricity, gas, telephone and 
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telegraph, as well as transportation. and ineans of 
travel. * * * It is impossible to meet these urgent 
requirements without making use of the· public 
property." Emphasis Added. 
While it may be observed that this statement of the court 
constitutes dicta of sorts, the consequences of such, from 
the viewpoint of the State Road Commission, are far reach-
ing, with the probability of future litigation resulting 
therefrom. If the premise derived from this language is to 
give the respondents a property interest in the public 
highway and, further, a right to be on the public right-of-
way, then we would respectfully. urge this statement to be 
in error and we hereby petition the Court to modify and/or 
clarify its intended meaning. 
The law has been consistent that a utility acquires no 
property right in the public right-of-way by its utilization 
for he operation of its facilities. Thus it was ~aid in Dela-
ware River v. The Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commis-
sion, 145 A.2d 172: 
''Historically in Pennsylvania non-transportation 
public utilities have been permitted to occupy high-
way rights-of-way free of cost, subject to the police 
power to control and regulate the high\vays for 
public bene-fit. Such utilities obtain no property 
rights in the highway. * * *" 
See also Delaware River Port Authority v. Pennsylvania 
Public Utilities Commission, 199 A.2d 85·5; Transit C,om-
mission v. Long Island Railroad Co., 253 N.Y. 345, 171 N.E. 
565; New York Tunnel Authority v. Consolidated Edison 
Co., 295 N.Y. 467, 68 N.E.2d 445; New Orleans Gaslight Co. 
v. Drainage Commission of New Orlea.ns, 197 U.S. 453, 25 
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S. Ct. 471, 49 L.Ed. 831; State of Idaho v. Idaho Power Co. 
and Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 
-Ida.-, 346 P.2d 596; State Highway Commission of New 
Mexico v. The Southern Union Gas Co., 65 N. Mex. 84, 332 
P.2d 1007. 
The United States Supreme Court in the New Orleans 
Gaslight Co. case put it this way: 
"* * * In the very terms of the grant there is a 
. recognition that the use of the streets by the gas 
company was to be in such manner as to least in-
convenience the city in the use thereof. Except that 
the privilege was conferred to use the streets * * * 
there was nothing in the terms of the grant to in-
dictate the intention of the state to give up its con-
trol of the public streets, * * *." (Emphasis added) 
The franchises submitted into evidence and before this 
Court indicate and specifically set forth that each of the 
respondents occupy the right-of-way as a privilege and 
license, the natural implication therefrom being that no 
right is existent to occupy and possess any part of such 
right-of-way. 
The statement of the Court, as quoted above, on its 
face, would seem to lend credit to the assertion in Re-
spondents' original brief that their use of the public right-
of-way is by way of an easement and qualifies as a vested 
property right. If such use was classified as an easement 
or other vested property interest, then quite naturally, the 
State of Utah, in order to acquire the interest in furtherance 
of its road building program, would be dependent upon 
the inherent power of eminent domain, 78-34-1 et seq, 
UCA 1953. The quick answer to this problem is, of course, 
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that the exercise of the State's power to condemn is not 
necessary, for the soverign's request of the utilities to re-
locate their facilities does not involve a taking within the 
scope of the statutes. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage 
Commission of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453, 25 S. Ct. 471, 49 
L.Ed. 831; Atlantic Coast LineR. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 
232 U.S. 548, 34 S. Ct. 364, 58 L.Ed. 721; State of Idaho v. 
Idaho Power Co. and Mountain States Telephone and Tele-
graph Co., -Ida.-, 346 P.2d 596. The use of the police 
power rather than the power of eminent domain sepa~ates 
permissive and revocable uses of property from vested 
property interests. 
In order that this Petitioner might avoid future liti-
gation and administrative indecision in the control and 
operation of the state highway system, we earnestly and 
respectfully request this Court to clarify the remark that 
the utility is at "home on the public highways." 
POINT III 
NEITHER THE UTILITY RELOCATION ACT 
NOR THE DECISION AS RENDERED IMPOSES 
AN OBLIGATION UPON THE STATE ROAD 
COMMISSION TO REIMBURSE RELOCATION 
COSTS IN CONTRA VENTI ON OF THE SPECI-
FIC TERMS OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT BE-
TWEEN THE UTILITY AND THE STATE ROAD 
COMMISSION. 
It is conceded that the common law required utilities 
to pay the entire cost of removing and relocating any facil-
ities located within the right-of-way of a public highway 
whenever the necessities of highway improvement so de-
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manded. (See Decision, Advance Green Sheet, p. 2.) This 
Court now takes the position that the Legislature may. 
change this common law rule prospectively, lift the cost 
burden from the utilities and impose it upon the State. 
(Decision, supra, p. 2.) This court is not impressed with 
the theory that the common law as it exists when a fran-
chise is granted becomes an integral part of the franchise, 
impervious to future modification by the Legislature. (De-
cision, supra, p. 7.) 
Though we insist there is good and sufficient author-
ity of historical sanction to the contrary (see Sturges v. 
Crowninshield, 4 Whet 122, L.Ed. 5·29; Home Building 
and Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 88 A.L.R. 1481), 
it is not our purpose here to argue the clear ruling of the 
Court regarding integration of the common law and abroa 
gation of same. We do wish to urge the discussion, how-
ever, of certain issues which have survived the Court's 
decision and certain issues which have arisen since the 
Court's decision. 
It appears obvious that the Court's decision deals only 
with the question: May the Legislature abrogate the com-
mon law? The Court says nothing as to whether or not the 
Legislature may shift the relocation burden to the State 
where by written agreement the utility has previously 
agreed to assume the burden. The Court specifically ac-
kowledges and calls attention to the fact that the franchises 
involved in the instant lawsuit are silent as to any removal 
or relocation of facilities. (Decision, supra, p. 1.) 
As the Court states: 
"* * * the question to be answered is whether or 
not the Legislature has the power to modify the 
common law, prospectively * * * ." Decision, p. 2.) 
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After answering this question in the affirmative the Court 
then states: 
"The theory that the common law rule as it existed 
when the franchises were granted became an in-
tegral part of the franchises as if expressly written 
therein * * * is not supported by the authorities." 
(Emphasis added) (Decision, p. 7.) 
Thus the Court clearly distinguishes the instant case and 
its holding from a situation where the relocation obligation 
is expressly written in the franchise. 
The Court is careful to explain that in the case of un-
written provisions the obligation of same does not come 
intO· existence until some circumstance prompts the im-
position of same. For example, in the instant case, even 
though the unwritten or common law imposed relocation 
costs on the utility, since nothing was specifically said 
concerning the same in the franchise agreement, there was 
no relocation obligation or liability until relocation was 
requested. Therefore, as stated by the Court, the Utility 
Relocation Act does not nullify any existing obligation in 
connection with the franchises involved because no obli-
gation existed at the time the Act was passed. 
Obviously if the parties had expressly agreed as to 
relocation in the franchise this would create an existing 
obligation or liability at the time the franchise was execut-
ed regardless of when the relocaton was actually ordered. 
Whether the obligation of a written agreement is executed 
or executory does not effect the binding nature of the obli-
gation. In the landmark case of Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 
87, 3 L.Ed. 162, 1810, Chief Justice Marshall, after defining 
a land grant as a contract, went on to discuss this point 
as follows: 
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"A contra.ct is a compact between two or more par-
ties, and is "either executory or· executed. * * * A 
contract executed, as well as one which is execu·-
tory, contains obligations binding on the parties. 
* * * Since then, in fact, a grant is a contract exe-
cuted, the obligation of which still continues, and 
since the Constitution uses the general term con-
tract, without distinguishing between those which 
are executory and those which are executed, it must 
be construed to comprehend the latter as well as 
the former.'~ 
Chief Justice Marshall then went on to conclude that 
the State of Georgia was restrained, either by general prin-
ciples which are common to our free institutions, or by 
the particular provisions of the Constitution of the United 
States, from passing a law impairing the obligation of a 
previous land contract. 
To the argument that the State could impair contract 
when the State itself was one of the contracting parties, 
Chief Justice Marshall had this to say: 
"If, under a fair construction of the Constitution, 
grants are comprehended under the term contracts, 
is a grant from the state excluded fro1n the opera-
tion of the provision? Is the clause to be considered 
as inhibiting the state from impairing the obligation 
of contracts between t-vvo individuals, but as exclud-
ing from that inhibition contracts made with itself? 
The words themselves contain no such distinction. 
They are general, and are applicable to contracts of 
every description. * * * What motive, then, for im-
plying, in words which import a general prohibition 
to impair the obligation of contracts, an exception 
in favor of the right to impair the obligation of 
those contracts into which the state may enter. 
* * * The court can perceive no sufficient grounds 
for making that distinction.'' 
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The protection due "executory" interests was further 
defined in the case of Piqua Branch of State Bank of Ohio 
v. Knoop, 16 How. 369, 14 L.Ed. 977, (1853). In this case 
the State of Ohio attempted to impair tax advantage, grant-
ed to certain banks in previous legislation, by a subsequent 
statute. The Supreme Court held that the State of Ohio, 
"Having power to make the contract, and rights becoming 
vested under it, it can no more be disregarded nor set aside 
by a subsequent legislature, than a grant for land.''' Text-
book writers classify that type of statute which attempts 
to impair a previously existing obligation. as a retroactive 
law and the general rule in relation thereto is stated by 
Willis as follows: 
"Retroactive laws may not violate obligation of 
contract." (Willis, Constitutional Law, 1936, p. 377.) 
Stated in another way: 
"Generally a retrospective statute affecting vested 
rights is invalid, and all retrospective statutes are 
strictly construed for courts have assumed that they 
generally operate unfairly." 
(Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd Ed. Sec. 
3102.) 
It is true that the courts have carved out an excep-
tion to the retrospective rule where the State is reasonably 
exercising its police power: 
"* * * the state power may be addressed directly 
to the prevention of the enforcement of contracts 
only when these are of a sort which the Legislature 
in its discretion may denounce as being in them-
selves hostile to public morals, or public health, 
safety, or welfare, or where the prohibition is mere-
ly of injurious practices; * * * interference with 
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the enforcement of other and valid contracts ac-
cording to appropriate legal procedure, although 
the interference is temporary and for a public pur-
pose, is not permissable." 
(Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, supra.) 
It is difficult to find in the instant case, however, that a 
statute providing for the payment of relocation costs is in 
the interest of public morals, health, safety or welfare. An 
order of relocation is an obvious exercise of the police 
power-payment of an invoice for the cost of relocation 
is obviously not an exercise of the police power. When the 
State pays a relocation invoice in contravention of a writ-
ten agreement by the utility, it does more than exercise the 
police power to regulate without compensation-it com-
mits an ultra virus, unconstitutional act by retroactively 
impairing the obligation of a legal contract. 
We submit tne instant decision stands only for the 
proposition that in any case of a relocation from public 
right-of-way ordered by the State Road Commission on 
or after May_ 14, 1957, the Road Commission, so long as 
the Federal Government by law will participate and so 
long as the parties have said nothing in writing to the 
contrary, must pay the relocation costs. 
POINT IV 
THE UTILITY RELOCATION ACT SPECIFIC-
ALLY PROTECTS THE OBLIGATION OF CON-
TRACT AND ABSOLVES THE STATE ROAD 
C 0 M M I S S I 0 N FROM RELOCATION COSTS 
WHERE BY WRITING, SUCH OBLIGATION 
HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN ASSUMED BY THE 
UTILITY. 
Actually, this Court had no other alternative under 
the statutes involved than to recognize a distinction be-
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tween written and unwritten provisions in the application 
of the Utility Relocation Act to existing obligations. 
Under the Utility Relocation Act the Road Commis-
sion to pay relocation costs only, 
"* * * in all cases where proportionate remiburse-
ment of such costs may be obtained by the State of 
Utah from the United States pursuant to the Fed-
eral Aid Highway Act of 1956.'' 
(Section 27-2-7(22) (a), U.C.A. 1953, supra.) 
The Road Commission's obligation to pay relocation 
costs applies, therefore, only to those situations where the 
Federal Government will participate. U·nder the Federal 
Highway Act: 
"* * * F1ederal funds shall not be used to reim-
burse the State under this section when the pay-
ment to the utility violates the law of the State or 
violates a legal contract between the utility and 
the State." 
(23 U.S.C., Section 123, supra.) 
If the utility occupies the public right-of-way under 
franchise or other written agreement executed by compe-
tent parties without fraud or duress, there exists a legal 
contract. The Federal Government will not reimburse re-
location costs if to do so would violate such a contract. Our 
State Legislature has intended and so stated that the Road 
Commission must not pay relocation costs where the Fed-
eral Government will not reimburse. Both the Federal Act 
and the State Act must be read in pari materia and when 
so read the conclusion is inescapable: Where a legal con-
tract exists between the utility and the State under which 
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the utility has specifically assumed relocation costs ·the 
Federal ·Government will not reimburse, and the Road 
Commission cannot pay. 
Our Legislature did not intend nor did it say that 
henceforth and forever in all situations the State must pay 
relocation costs. It did not intend to create a new rule of 
substantive law nor did it intend to abrogate existing writ-
ten contracts. To the contrary, the Federal and State Acts 
combine to specifically protect the obligation of written 
agreements between the utility and the State. Our Legis-
lature merely carved out an exception to the common law 
rule regarding relocation costs and provided that so long 
as the Federal Government will participate the State will 
pay such costs. This Court then limits the application of 
the Act to prospective requests for relocation where the 
parties have been silent concerning the relocation 
obligation. 
It has been assumed that the respondents likewise 
understood the distinction in this matter between situa-
tions involving a previously executed written agreement 
and situations where the parties had been silent. It is the 
statement of the respondents that: 
"The question before this Court thus concerns the 
validity of provisions of the substantive law, enact-
ed by the Legislature in the exercise of the police 
power of the State. Its effect is clearly limited to 
relocations ordered by the Commission after the 
effective date of the Act. It does not purport to 
release any oblgations which utilities may have had 
in connection with past relocations of facilities." 
(Brief of Respondents, p. 9.) 
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However, since the Court's decision herein, the respond-
ents have demanded reimbursement for all relocations 
ordered after May 14, 1957, regardless of the terms of the 
writing under which the utility occupied the premises. For 
this reason petitioner requests clarification and restate-
ment of the Court's postion. 
POINT V 
THE UTILITY RELOCATION ACT IS, BY ITS 
VERY TERMS, DEVISABLE AND THE PROVISO 
REGARDING RELOCATION COSTS DOES NOT 
QUALIFY OR EFFECT THE PLENARY POWER. 
GRANTED TO THE ROAD COMIVIISSION 
TO REGULATE, CONTROL AND RELOCATE 
FACILITIES LOCATED ON A PUBLIC RIGHT-
OF-WAY. 
It must be remembered that the cost of relocation 
phrase of the Utility Relocation Act was inserted by way 
of proviso. The general enactment was for the purpose of 
granting to the Road Commission the power "* * * to 
make reasonable regulations for the * * * relocation of all 
facilities * * * of any utility. Whenever the Commission 
shall determine that any such facilities * * * should be 
relocated, the utility * * * owning or operating such facil-
ities shall relocate the same in accordance with the order 
of the Commission; * * *. '' 
(27-2-7(22) (a), U.C.A. 1953, supra.) 
Respondent would have us believe that the sole pur-
pose of the Utility Relocation Act is to rectify an allegedly 
unfair sjtuation and provide for the payment of relocation 
costs. We would suggest to the contrary that the primary 
purpose of the Act was to indicate, without equivocation, 
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the right of the Road Commission on Federal Aid projects 
to regulate and relocate utilities. The cost proviso was, we 
think, misused by the Legislature to introduce independ-
ent legislation. In any event it is clear that the cost proviso 
is separable and devisable from the general enactment and 
in application does no more than burden the general pow-
er of relocation with a cost obligation under certain 
circumstances. 
The cost proviso must be strictly construed and close-
ly guarded in its application. 
"As in all other cases, a proviso should be interp-
reted consistently with the legislative intent. Where 
the proviso itself must be considered in an attempt 
to determine the intent of the legislature, it should 
be strictly construed. This is true because the leg-
islative purpose set forth in the general enactment 
expresses the legislative policy and only those sub-
jects expressly exempted by the proviso should be 
freed from the operation of the statute." 
(Sutherland, supra, Section 4933.) 
Not only is the cost proviso limited as to application, 
it is by its terms limited as to duration. Its life span is 
limited to the life span of the Federal Highway Act of 
1956 and is coextensive therewith. When the Federal High-
way Act expires or is sooner terminated, any relocation 
cost obligation on Federal aid projects will cease. By con-
trast the relocation power granted by the State statute is 
to apply to: 
"* * * any project on the federal aid primary or 
secondary system of highways as the same now are 
or may hereafter be defined by Act of Congress, or 
on the interstate system, as herein defined, includ-
ing extension thereof within urban areas." 
(Section 27-2-7(22) (a), U.C.A., supra.) 
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The petitioner envisions that long after the Federal High-
way Act of 1956 expires relocations in connection with 
federal aid projects will continue. 
By no stretch of imagination did the cost proviso of 
the Utility Relocation Act suddenly grant new property 
or contractual rights to the utilities in connection with 
federal aid highways. The obligation to relocate from the 
path of federal aid projects on order of the Commission is 
mandatory. The cost proviso is directory. The power of 
the Road Commission to regulate the use of its rights of 
way by a utility is plenary and complete. Since the decision 
of this Court has apparently suggested a different conclu-
sion to the utilities, and an issue in this regard persists, 
clarification and restatement of the Court's position is 
appropriate. 
POINT VI 
THE PERMISSIVE USE GRANTED TO A UTIL-
ITY OF THE PUBLIC HIGHWAYS DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE A USE AS NECESSARY AND 
INDISPENSABLE AS THE USE OF SUCH 
HIGHWAY AS A MEDIUM FOR VEHICULAR 
TRAFFIC. 
We call the Court's attention to the statement found 
in the main opinion herein: 
"* * * the presence of the utility facilities on the 
streets constitutes a use as indispensable as the use 
for travel, * * * ." 
This observation is both unique and surprising to the ex-
tent that not even the respondents herein have contended 
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that Congress, under the Federal Highway Act of 1956, 
and the Utah Legislature, under present and projected road 
building programs, laid as their primary basis for the con-
struction of highways, freeways and expressways the hous-
ing of privately owned utility facilities. It takes not an 
expe-rt to realize the real need and necessity for highly 
designed road beds in order to take care of present and 
future day vehicular traffic, intrastate and interstate. 
The Legislature of the State of Utah defines public 
highway at 27-1-1, U.C.A._ 1953. The plain meaning of this 
statute suggests that the primary purpose of a highway 
is to facilitate the movement of vehicles from one point 
to another. 
A permissive occupation of the respondents and of 
privately ovvned utilities in general in no measure pr~ 
voked the passage of the 1956 Federal Highway Act; rath-
er, it was the forecast of the Congress for the requirement 
of transportation facilities to accommodate the great influx 
of vehicular traffic within the next 13 years that brought 
about the legislation. 
This fact is pointedly illustrated by the Declaration 
of Policy of the United States Congress found in Section 
101 (b), Title 23, U .S.C.: 
"It is hereby declared to be in the national interest 
to accelerate the construction of the Federal Aid 
Highway Systems, including the National System 
of Interstate and Defense Highways, since many of 
such highways or portions thereof, are in fact inade-
quate to meet the needs of local and interstate com-
merce, for the national and civil defense. 
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"It is hereby declared that the prompt and early 
completion of the National System of Interstate and 
Defense Highways, so named because of its· pri-
mary importance to the national defense and 
hereafter referred to as the 'Interstate System' is 
essential to the national interest and is one of the 
most important objectives of this Act. It is the in-
tent of Congress that the Interstate System shall 
be completed as nearly as practicable over the pe-
r.iod of availability of the 13 years appropriations 
authorized for the purpose of expediting its con-
struction, reconstruction or improvement, * * *" 
Public Law, 85-767, August 27, 1958, 72 Stat. 885. 
(Emp.hasis added) 
It is sufficient to say that in the present age when the ex-
peditious transfer of motor vehicle traffic is at a premium 
and the movement of goods, individuals and commerce in 
general is a foremost public concern, the usage of property 
for such traffic and travel has no parallel when compared 
with incidental usage by the respondents. 
The above quoted statement of the Court, although 
not essential to its decision on the merits of the questions 
before it, has placed the State Road Commission in a posi-
tion where the future projection of highway construction 
and reconstruction is in serious jeopardy, due to the con-
tinuing and increasing necessity to negotiate with the 
respondents and other privately owned utilities to locate 
and place their facilities on the public highway; on this 
ground, we would therefore urge and respectfully petition 
this Court to reconsider the above mentioned sentence in 
the light of the obvious, and to alter it by way of clarifica-
tion or by striking it in its entirety from the majority 
opinion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Rehearing submitted by this petition-
er should, based on the points and issues of law raised 
herein, be accepted and granted by this Court and the 
Court should reconsider its former opinion and specific 
parts thereof and rehear arguments on the merits of the 
constitutionality of Section 27-2-7(22), U.C.A. 1953, as 
amended, in light of the constitutional questions of law 
raised. 
Additionally, or in the alternative, this Court should 
clarify and explain the meaning it attributes to the lan-
guage used in the main opinion with specific reference to 
the questions and argument raised by this petitioner in 
Points II, III, IV, V, and VI herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
ROBERTS. CAMPBELL, JR. 
F'RANKL YN B. MATHESON 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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